Section 148 — Enlargement of time
A little give in the Court’s own clock. Where the Court has fixed or granted a period for doing an act under the Code, it may, in its discretion, enlarge that period — even after it has expired. Since 1999 the enlargement is capped at thirty days in total.
How to read Section 148
The power
The Court may extend a time-period it itself fixed or granted for an act prescribed or allowed by the Code — in its discretion, from time to time.
The 30-day cap
Since the 1999 amendment, the total enlargement may not exceed thirty days — a brake on indefinite extensions.
Even after expiry
The period can be enlarged even though it has already expired — the power is not lost when the time runs out.
The bare Act
Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, [not exceeding thirty days in total,]1 even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.
1 The words “not exceeding thirty days in total” inserted by Act 46 of 1999, s. 13 (w.e.f. 1-7-2002).
In short: if the Court set a time-limit for some act under the Code, it can stretch that limit at its discretion — even once it has passed — but the total extra time it grants cannot exceed thirty days.
→ § 148 applies only to a period fixed or granted by the Court — not to statutory periods of limitation for suits / appeals (those belong to the Limitation Act). The 1999 cap of thirty days curbed the once-unlimited discretion. The power survives the period’s expiry, so an act done a little late can still be regularised.
Key terms decoded
A time-limit the Court itself set — e.g. time to make up a court-fee (§ 149), to furnish security, or to file a document. Not a Limitation-Act period.
A step the Code requires or permits — the kind of act for which the Court grants time.
The Court may extend, and may do so more than once — but always as a matter of judicial discretion, on good reason.
The 1999 cap: however many extensions are granted, the aggregate may not exceed thirty days.
The Court may enlarge the period after it has run out — it need not act before the deadline passes.
§ 148 does not extend periods of limitation for instituting suits / appeals — only court-granted procedural periods.
The picture — stretch the Court’s own deadline, up to 30 days
§ 148 keeps procedure humane: a party who slightly overruns a court-set deadline is not automatically shut out — the Court may grant a short extension, even afterwards — while the thirty-day cap keeps that indulgence from drifting into indefinite delay.
Part by part — the one sentence
Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court … the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period…
The Court may extend a deadline it set itself — at its discretion, and more than once if need be.
…not exceeding thirty days in total…
Inserted in 1999 (w.e.f. 2002): the total of all enlargements may not exceed thirty days — a firm outer limit on the discretion.
…even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired.
The Court can act after the time has run out — it does not lose the power simply because the deadline has passed.
Why it matters
Flexibility for the Court’s own deadlines — with a hard outer limit
§ 148 trades rigid time-keeping for bounded discretion.
Connected provisions
Section 148 opens Part XI’s time, caveat, fees & inherent-powers group (§§ 148–151). It governs the Court’s power over its own time-limits — e.g. the time it grants to make up a court-fee deficiency under § 149.