Court may presume existence of certain facts
The court’s general power to infer. The court may presume the existence of any fact it thinks likely to have happened — judged by the common course of natural events, human conduct and ordinary business. Nine classic illustrations show it in action; ten caveats show when common sense points the other way.
How to read Section 119
The court MAY presume any fact it thinks likely to have happened — measured against the common course of events, human conduct and business.
The court may presume the existence of any fact it thinks likely to have happened.
Judged by the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business — in relation to the facts of the case.
Nine illustrations (a)–(i) show it in action; ten caveats in (2) show when the same facts point the other way.
The bare Act
The section in its own words — the general rule, nine illustrations, and the countervailing facts in sub-section (2).
(1) The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.
The Court may presume that—
(a) a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession;
(b) an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars;
(c) a bill of exchange, accepted or endorsed, was accepted or endorsed for good consideration;
(d) a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence;
(e) judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;
(f) the common course of business has been followed in particular cases;
(g) evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it;
(h) if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law, the answer, if given, would be unfavourable to him;
(i) when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged.
(2) The Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following, in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it:—
(i) as to Illustration (a)—a shop-keeper has in his bill a marked rupee soon after it was stolen, and cannot account for its possession specifically, but is continually receiving rupees in the course of his business;
(ii) as to Illustration (b)—A, a person of the highest character, is tried for causing a man’s death by an act of negligence in arranging certain machinery. B, a person of equally good character, who also took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and admits and explains the common carelessness of A and himself;
(iii) as to Illustration (b)—a crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of the crime implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to render previous concert highly improbable;
(iv) as to Illustration (c)—A, the drawer of a bill of exchange, was a man of business. B, the acceptor, was a young and ignorant person, completely under A’s influence;
(v) as to Illustration (d)—it is proved that a river ran in a certain course five years ago, but it is known that there have been floods since that time which might change its course;
(vi) as to Illustration (e)—a judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances;
(vii) as to Illustration (f)—the question is, whether a letter was received. It is shown to have been posted, but the usual course of the post was interrupted by disturbances;
(viii) as to Illustration (g)—a man refuses to produce a document which would bear on a contract of small importance on which he is sued, but which might also injure the feelings and reputation of his family;
(ix) as to Illustration (h)—a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled by law to answer, but the answer to it might cause loss to him in matters unconnected with the matter in relation to which it is asked;
(x) as to Illustration (i)—a bond is in possession of the obligor, but the circumstances of the case are such that he may have stolen it.
In short: this is the court’s general, discretionary power to fill gaps by common sense. It may — not must — presume the existence of any fact it thinks likely to have happened, tested against the common course of natural events, human conduct and business. The nine illustrations are the classic ‘may presume’ situations: recent possession of stolen goods points to the thief or a knowing receiver; an accomplice is suspect unless corroborated; a bill was for consideration; a state of things continues; official acts were regularly done; business followed its usual course; withheld evidence would have hurt the withholder; a refusal to answer tells against him; a bond in the obligor’s hands is discharged. But sub-section (2) is the crucial counter-weight: these are maxims, not fixed rules — the court must weigh the actual facts (an innocent explanation, a disrupted post, a document that merely embarrasses) that can make the inference fail.
→ This carries forward IEA 1872 § 114 — the court’s general power to presume facts from the common course of events.
Glossary
A discretionary inference — the court may, not must, draw it (and may call for proof of the fact).
What, on common experience, probably occurred.
What usually happens in the natural and physical world.
How people ordinarily behave.
The usual course of official and commercial dealings.
The illustrations are guides to inference — the court weighs them against the actual facts (the sub-section (2) caveats).
The picture
From common experience the court may infer a likely fact — but each inference bends to the facts of the case.
The section, part by part
Tap a part — the picture-story tells it first; the word-by-word text and example follow.
the powerThe court may draw any inference that common experience supports
illustrations & (2)Nine classic ‘may presume’ situations — each with a counter-check
Connected provisions
Dowry death
The mandatory ‘shall presume’ just before — contrast the discretionary ‘may’ here.
A specific ‘may presume’
§ 117 is one named ‘may presume’; § 119 is the general power behind them all.
Absence of consent (rape)
A mandatory presumption of no consent in § 64(2) rape prosecutions — closes Chapter VII.
IEA 1872, § 114
Carried forward — the court’s general power to presume facts from the common course of events.
