Evidence as to application of language which can apply to one only of several persons
A description that fits more than one, but was meant for one. Where the words could apply to any one of several persons or things but only one was meant, evidence may be given to show which.
How to read Section 99
Several candidates, one intended → evidence chooses.
Words could fit any one of several — but only one was meant.
Evidence may be given of facts showing which.
Only to pick among the candidates — not to vary a term.
The bare Act
The section in its own words — the rule and two illustrations.
When the facts are such that the language used might have been meant to apply to any one, and could not have been meant to apply to more than one, of several persons or things, evidence may be given of facts which show which of those persons or things it was intended to apply to.
(a) A agrees to sell to B, for one thousand rupees, “my white horse”. A has two white horses. Evidence may be given of facts which show which of them was meant.
(b) A agrees to accompany B to Ramgarh. Evidence may be given of facts showing whether Ramgarh in Rajasthan or Ramgarh in Uttarakhand was meant.
In short: the second kind of latent ambiguity. In § 98 the plain words fit nothing; here they fit too much — the description answers to several persons or things, though the parties can only have meant one. ‘My white horse’ when the seller owns two; ‘Ramgarh’ when there are two towns of that name. Because the writing itself cannot tell them apart, the law lets evidence in to show which of the candidates was intended. The power is limited to selecting among the things the words genuinely fit — it is not a route to introduce a thing outside the description, nor to alter the bargain’s terms.
→ This carries forward IEA 1872 § 96 — the latent ambiguity of an over-inclusive description.
Glossary
The words fit several candidates, though only one was meant.
Uncertainty that surfaces only when words meet the facts.
The description is capable of fitting each candidate.
Only one can have been intended.
The single question evidence answers.
Fits nothing (98) versus fits several (99).
The picture
Two candidates, one intended — evidence decides.
The section, part by part
Tap a part — the picture-story tells it first; the word-by-word text and example follow.
the ruleFits several, meant one — evidence picks which
two latent kindsFits nothing (§ 98) · fits several (§ 99)
Connected provisions
Two sets of facts
Where language applies partly to one set of facts and partly to another.
IEA 1872, § 96
Carried forward — language applying to one of several.
