Facts bearing on question whether act was accidental or intentional
The series rule: when the question is “accident or design?”, the fact that the act was one of a series of similar occurrences — with the same person concerned in each — is relevant.
How to read Section 13
Two ingredients, one inference.
Answering “accident or intention?” (or “with what knowledge?”) through a series of similar occurrences.
Similarity of the events — and the same person concerned in each. Both must be present.
Once may be chance; a pattern with the same hand makes accident highly unlikely — a specialised cousin of § 12.
The bare Act
The section in its own words — colour-keyed by what each phrase does.
When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.
(a) A is accused of burning down his house in order to obtain money for which it is insured. The facts that A lived in several houses successively each of which he insured, in each of which a fire occurred, and after each of which fires A received payment from a different insurance company, are relevant, as tending to show that the fires were not accidental.
(b) A is employed to receive money from the debtors of B. It is A’s duty to make entries in a book showing the amounts received by him. He makes an entry showing that on a particular occasion he received less than he really did receive. The question is, whether this false entry was accidental or intentional. The facts that other entries made by A in the same book are false, and that the false entry is in each case in favour of A, are relevant.
(c) A is accused of fraudulently delivering to B a counterfeit currency. The question is, whether the delivery of the currency was accidental. The facts that, soon before or soon after the delivery to B, A delivered counterfeit currency to C, D and E are relevant, as showing that the delivery to B was not accidental.
In short: when “accident” is the defence, the law lets the pattern speak: the same kind of event, again and again, with the same person in each — burning houses, convenient ledger errors, repeated counterfeits — makes design the natural reading.
→ § 12 proves the mind by outside facts; § 13 proves it by repetition — the narrowest and sharpest of the mind-proving tools.
Glossary
Without intention — the “oops” defence this section exists to test.
The same kind of event, repeated — fires, false entries, counterfeit deliveries.
Involved in — the person must figure in each event of the series.
The section serves knowledge questions too — did he know the note was fake?
The inference the series supports: repetition with the same hand points away from chance.
The picture
One event asks a question; a series answers it.
The section, part by part
Tap a part — the picture-story tells it first; the word-by-word text and example follow.
the ruleOnce is chance — a series is design
IllustrationsThe three pictures the Act itself gives
Overview — Section 13 at a glance: when “accident” is the defence, a series of similar occurrences (the same person concerned in each) is relevant to show the act was by design, not chance. (tap to zoom)
Illustration (a) — A is accused of burning his house for insurance. That he lived in several houses successively, each insured, in each of which a fire occurred, and after each received payment from a different insurer, tends to show the fires were not accidental. (tap to zoom)
Illustration (b) — A must record money he receives for B. That his other entries in the same book are also false, and each false entry is in his own favour, tends to show the false entry in question was intentional, not accidental. (tap to zoom)
Connected provisions
State of mind
The parent rule — § 13 is its sharpest specialised tool, and Exp. 1’s red line still applies.
Residuary doors
A series also makes accident highly improbable — the two sections often walk together.
Course of business
The next section: the ordinary course of business as a basis of inference.
IEA 1872, § 15
This provision carries forward section 15 of the repealed Evidence Act.
