When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant
The residuary doors of relevancy: a fact with no route of its own enters if it is inconsistent with a fact in issue — the alibi — or makes a fact highly probable or improbable.
How to read Section 9
Two doors, one high bar, and the most famous defence in criminal law.
Facts that fit no other route (§§ 4–8) still enter through two doors: (1) inconsistency, (2) high probability or improbability.
“I was elsewhere” has no relevancy route of its own — it enters because it collides with the prosecution’s case.
Door 2 is not for every make-weight: the fact must move the scales heavily — highly probable, or highly improbable.
The bare Act
The section in its own words — colour-keyed by what each phrase does.
Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant—
(a) The question is, whether A committed a crime at Chennai on a certain day. The fact that, on that day, A was at Ladakh is relevant. The fact that, near the time when the crime was committed, A was at a distance from the place where it was committed, which would render it highly improbable, though not impossible, that he committed it, is relevant.
(b) The question is, whether A committed a crime. The circumstances are such that the crime must have been committed either by A, B, C or D. Every fact which shows that the crime could have been committed by no one else, and that it was not committed by either B, C or D, is relevant.
In short: two residuary doors stand at the end of the first stretch of the catalogue. Door 1 admits facts that collide with the case — the alibi. Door 2 admits facts that swing a fact in issue to highly probable or improbable — alone or in combination, like a chain of elimination.
→ The doors open both ways — for the defence (the alibi) and for the prosecution (the closing circle of elimination).
Glossary
Two facts that cannot both be true — presence in Ladakh collides with presence at the Chennai crime.
“Elsewhere” — the plea that the accused was at another place; the classic door-1 fact.
Door 2’s standard — the fact must move the scales heavily, not marginally.
Ruling out every other candidate until only one remains — illustration (b).
A fact that fits none of the routes in §§ 4–8 — the section exists precisely for these.
The picture
A homeless fact and the two doors that take it in.
The section, part by part
Tap a part — the picture-story tells it first; the word-by-word text and example follow.
the ruleTwo special doors
IllustrationsThe two pictures the Act itself gives
Connected provisions
The named routes
§ 9 exists for facts those routes miss — read it as the catalogue’s safety-net.
Burden of proof
He who sets up an alibi must prove it — the burden rules of Chapter VII carry that weight.
IEA 1872, § 11
This provision carries forward section 11 of the repealed Evidence Act.
