Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 35
The mirror of § 35: a judgment on a matter of a public nature is relevant to a later inquiry — but, unlike an in rem judgment, it is not conclusive proof of what it states.
How to read Section 36
Relevant — but never the last word.
Any judgment, order or decree other than the in rem ones of § 35.
If it relates to a matter of a public nature relevant to the enquiry.
It is not conclusive proof of what it states — the Court still weighs it.
The bare Act
The section in its own words — colour-keyed by what each phrase does.
Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 35 are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.
A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies. The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land, in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.
In short: where a matter is of public concern — a public right of way, a public custom — an earlier judgment on it can be looked at in a later case. But because such matters are not decided in rem, that earlier judgment does not bind; it is evidence to be weighed, not conclusive proof.
→ This carries forward IEA 1872 § 42 — the counterpart to the conclusive in rem rule in § 35.
Glossary
Any judgment that is not a probate / matrimonial / admiralty / insolvency in rem judgment.
Something of general/public concern — a public right of way, a public custom — not a purely private fact.
The public matter the judgment decided must actually bear on the present case.
The judgment may be looked at and weighed, but it can be contradicted — it does not bind.
The illustration’s example — a right the public has to pass over land; a classic public-nature matter.
Open to being disproved — the hallmark that separates § 36 from the conclusive § 35.
The picture
§ 35 vs § 36 — conclusive, or merely relevant.
The section, part by part
Tap a part — the picture-story tells it first; the word-by-word text and example follow.
the rulePublic-nature judgments — helpful, not final
relevant, not conclusiveThe Act’s own illustration
Connected provisions
Judgments in rem
§ 35 judgments are conclusive; § 36 judgments are only relevant — the two ends of the scale.
Right or custom
Public rights and customs — the very “public-nature” matters this section is about.
IEA 1872, § 42
Carried forward — the counterpart to the conclusive in rem rule of § 35.
